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The purpose of this MBA Project was to determine whether or not a Senator or 
Representative’s previous military service had any influence on how he or she supported 
defense appropriations. During the course of this project, four shipbuilding programs 
over the previous twenty years were analyzed: LCS, MCM-1, LPD-17, and DDG-51. 
This research showed that military experience does have a positive effect of Department 
of Defense Appropriations at the committee level. Some Senators and Representatives, 
who lacked military experience, actually appeared to be against military spending. In 
both cases, though, the effects of military experience were outweighed by a much larger 
concern. Where a ship was actually built had a much larger effect on how much 
Congressional support that particular program received. Therefore, from the results of 
this study, one can extrapolate that where a particular program is built has a significantly 
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Military experience does appear to have an effect on votes for defense 
appropriations. However, this experience has a greater impact on committee actions than 
it does on House and Senate floor voting actions. Prior military experience may make 
some members more inclined to give a defense program its needed dollars. A lack of 
military experience may make others less inclined to support DOD programs. However, 
the actual location where a defense program’s unit is built will be a much greater 
determinant of the appropriations dollars that the program receives. The history of four 
separate shipbuilding programs provides evidence of these conclusions. 
 In the case of the LCS, military experience proved to be a positive indicator for 
the program. In committees that had a great deal of prior military experience, the program 
was seen as an effective, cost saving measure to give the Navy its needed capabilities at a 
reasonable price. Committees that did not have as wide a range of previous military 
experience did not share the same views and, thus, did not support the programs. When 
appropriation decisions were made on the House and Senate floor, however, prior 
military experience did not have as much of an impact. Several changes were made to the 
program which did not directly correlate to the prior experiences of those involved. 
Instead, the shipyards appeared to be the greater concern as funding was given in advance 
for the more expensive DD(X) and DDG-51 programs. These programs helped out the 
larger shipyards while the smaller yards were slated to begin construction on the LCS. 
 The MCM-1 program showed that military experience can have a negative impact 
on appropriations when a program is falling behind. The smaller shipyards in Wisconsin 
had difficulties with producing the first ships of this class. As a result, the House and 
Senate committees withdrew some support for the program. They seemed to show a great 
degree of trepidation with spending advanced procurement dollars on new ships while the 
units already purchased had not been completed. Since the committees involved 
contained a great deal of prior military experience, their actions seemed to be based on 
the perceptions of a need to handle defense money responsibly. Unlike the committee 
action, the House and Senate floor action did not provide evidence either way as to 
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whether prior military experience had any effect on the program’s appropriations. In fact, 
the Wisconsin delegation appeared to be unusually lackluster in its support of the 
program. Upon closer examination, it appears that, since the shipyards did not depend on 
Navy contracts for their survival, the delegation did not see as much need to fight for the 
program. 
 To emphasize this point, the LPD-17 program was treated much differently when 
its shipyard was falling behind schedule. The involved committees desired to delay the 
procurement of additional units until the design problems were fixed. However, when the 
relevant appropriations bills reached the House and Senate floors, advanced funding was 
appropriated for additional units even though the shipyard had not begun construction on 
the first unit. In MCM-1’s case, the shipyards were not able to deliver the first units on 
time, but in LPD-17’s case, the shipyard was still trying to design the first unit. This shift 
in attitude was a direct result of the Mississippi delegation’s lobbying efforts. Realizing 
that Ingalls needed the Navy contract in order to remain fiscally viable, the delegation 
pushed to have some money given to the program by citing that the money would help to 
maintain America’s industrial base. 
 The history of the DDG-51 program provides further evidence of these policies. 
Over the program’s history, committees with a large amount of prior military experience 
have supported the program. Conversely, House and Senate members with a lack of 
military experience have voted against the program when they voted against House and 
Senate Appropriation Bills. Military experience did have an effect on the program, at 
least while the relevant bills were in committee.  
However, the more striking examples of how this program has been treated can be 
seen in recent years. As the larger shipyards were discovering a lag between the end of 
the DDG-51 program and the beginning of the DD(X) program, they grew concerned 
about their financial stability. As a result, the Mississippi and Maine delegations pushed 
to either have new DDG-51 units built or to have advance procurement dollars 
appropriated for the next program. Therefore, while military experience does appear to 
play a role in how money is appropriated to a program, it is obvious that where a unit is 




In the recent past, the Navy has argued that it must maintain 300 ships in order to 
meet its worldwide commitments. [Ref 1:p. 876] This number allowed ships to conduct a 
deployment of up to six months, after which the ship would return to its homeport in 
order to perform maintenance and training. When one ship returned from deployment, 
there was already another that had taken its place. This allowed the Navy to maintain a 
constant presence around the world and this gave each ship the ability to maintain peak 
efficiency. More importantly, the relatively stable schedule and lengthy periods in a 
homeport helped the Navy recruit and retain enough sailors to properly man these 
vessels. 
After a ship’s deployment ended, the maintenance period lasted approximately six 
months and the training period lasted up to one year. This cycle allowed these vessels 
enough time to perform required corrective and preventive maintenance in a shipyard 
environment which would extend that ship’s useful service life. In addition, since a ship’s 
crew is constantly changing, the training time allowed the newer crewmembers to get 
their required qualifications before the next deployment. This training period also 
included relatively short periods where a ship’s crew could practice the operations that 
they would perform over a deployment. 
However, increased global commitments have drastically changed these policies. 
Congress has been unable to fund shipbuilding programs to the amounts which would 
maintain the required 300 ship level in the future. For example, in 2004 the House 
Appropriations Committee cut $248 Million from the DD(X) Program which will delay 
procuring the first ship of this class but added $100 Million in appropriations to 
modernize the Arleigh Burke class destroyers. [Ref. 2:p. 1422]  Essentially, these 
appropriations force the Navy to constantly maintain an aging fleet rather than replace 
older ships with a newer class as the new ships are built.  
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While, at first, this seems like a method to save critical budget dollars while 
maintaining enough ships to meet worldwide commitments, these budget decisions end 
up costing the Department of Defense more money in the long run. The Navy has rarely 
been able to keep smaller ships operating for more than thirty years. The problem is not 
that the hulls are not durable enough but that the mechanical and electrical equipment 
starts to deteriorate rapidly as a ship ages. [Ref. 3:p. 542] According to procurement 
officials, “as you approach the end of a ship’s service life, you see an exponential 
increase in the amount of maintenance dollars you need to pump into them.” [Ref. 3:p. 
542] Therefore, by delaying the procurement of a newer class of ship, Congress may be 
saving money today and generating larger costs in the future.  
The changing global environment has accelerated these problems by requiring 
ships to be able to counter the various threats posed by terrorism. For example, ships are 
now needed to keep an aircraft carrier safe from both diesel submarine and small boat 
threats. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, has recommended that the 
fleet size be increased to 375 ships in order to operate effectively in our current 
environment. [Ref. 4:p. 515] In order to meet these new requirements, the Navy has 
proposed a new type of small, agile ship called the LCS (Littoral Combat Ship). This 
platform is designed to fight effectively in a littoral environment using a variety of 
weapons packages, each tailored for a particular mission. Most importantly, the LCS is a 
relatively inexpensive way to maintain the needed force structure. Since the ships are 
budgeted for $220 Million each (compared to the $1.2 Billion needed for an Arleigh 
Burke class destroyer), they provide the means to meet the CNO’s request. Though this 
seems like an ideal solution, Congress has focused its efforts of procuring a smaller 
number of Arleigh Burke destroyers, even though current shipbuilding efforts will not 
meet the Navy’s requirements.  
Overall, approximately ten ships are needed per year to maintain current force 





 The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that determine how much 
money Congress appropriates for Department of Defense programs by closely examining 
the reasons why individual Senators and Representatives vote to appropriate certain 
monies to Navy shipbuilding programs. One cannot help but notice that those who vote 
on this funding, the Senators and Representatives, as a group, do not have the same 
military background that they had twenty years ago. This shift in experience could 
explain why these programs received their respective levels of funding. 
 This research is intended to answer this question and, when the answer proves 
inconclusive, to delve further into the reasons why Congress appropriates more money 
for some programs and less for others. Due to time constraints, this research will examine 
the appropriation history of four shipbuilding programs since 1984. Each program was 
started at a different period in our nation’s history where the Navy’s force structure needs 
were different. While the research is rather limited in scope, an overview of how each 
program is treated over time should be very useful. In addition, the research will seek to 
ascertain whether some appropriations for these programs were as a result of apparent 
favoritism on behalf of those with prior naval service or on behalf of a particular 
constituency.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The primary question addressed in this research is: Does prior military service 
have an effect on the way members of Congress vote for DOD appropriations and, if such 
an effect exits, would the cause be prior military service? 
 Secondary research questions are: 
1. Do Pro/Con votes change over time? 
2. If the voting pattern appears to change over time, is it due to the general 
public’s feeling about the military at that time? 
3. Does a person’s voting record appear to be more in support of his or her 
constituency rather than any particular feelings about national defense? 
4. Do some Congressmen and Senators change the way they vote due to a 
shifting in their political viewpoint? 
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5. Do Congressmen and Senators with prior military experience appear 
partial to their own service?  
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
 This research provides insights as to why Department of Defense programs 
receive more or less fiscal support from Congress. By looking at whether military 
experience is a factor, one can further understand the relationship between Congress and 
the Department of Defense. In addition, the answers to the research questions will give 
Navy financial managers a better understanding of the amount of influence they have 
over a program’s funding.  
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
 The scope included: (1) a review of all Congressional backgrounds over the last 
twenty years, (2) identification of key appropriation bills for four shipbuilding programs: 
DDG-51, MCM-1, LPD-17, and LCS, (3) thorough analysis of each Congressman’s vote 
for each program’s appropriation over time. This thesis summarizes the data and provides 
an analysis of Congressional voting records over the last twenty years. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
 The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following steps: 
1. Examined the backgrounds of all U.S. Senators and Representatives who 
have served since 1984 in order to compare their various backgrounds. 
2. Compiled a list of all involved Congressmen and Senators and grouped 
according to party affiliation, military service, and type of service. 
3. Used the Congressional Quarterly Almanac and Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly, et al. to locate all relevant appropriation bills for the programs in question. 
4. Examined the voting records of all involved Congressmen and Senators 
for appropriation votes regarding the four examined programs. 
5. Reviewed each Congressman and Senator’s voting record over time to 
determine if a member’s views appeared to change. 
6. Examined the appropriation voting records of Congress as a whole over 
the period to determine if the general political mood of the time has been affecting the 
appropriation votes. 
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7. Cross-analyzed all information and investigated for trends. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 This thesis looks at each shipbuilding program separately. First, an introduction 
gives a history of the program. Items that are included are the ship’s capabilities, where 
the ship was built, and the Navy’s reasons for developing the program. This analysis 
provides insight as to what advantages the program provided to the Department of 
Defense as well as the price tag associated with the program.  
 Next, the thesis looks at the committee actions in the House of Representatives 
and the Senate regarding each program. Subcommittee actions are also included as 
necessary. Since all shipbuilding appropriations were part of the larger DOD 
appropriations bills, the committee votes, marks, and statements will shed further light on 
why certain Senators and Representatives supported or did not support these programs. 
The backgrounds of relevant committee members were analyzed in detail to help answer 
the research questions.    
 Third, this thesis examined how the House of Representatives and Senate as a 
whole voted on these programs. Authorization bills were included in this analysis, as 
appropriate, when their nature provided greater insight as to why certain members cast a 
yes or no vote. 
 Finally, this thesis looks at the politics surrounding where each ship was built. 
Since an individual shipyard can provide a large number of jobs, looking at where a 
particular ship was built can help one determine if a Senator or Congressman cast a vote 





































 II. THE LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) 
A. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 The Littoral Combat Ship was designed to meet a wide variety of needs in a 
changing global environment. In the past, the Navy was more focused on a large scale 
“blue water” conflict with a conventional navy. This concept required the development of 
two different types of ship. One was the Ticonderoga class guided missile cruiser, the 
first of which was commissioned in the early 1980’s. This platform was primarily 
designed to provide air defense against a large number of incoming enemy aircraft and 
missiles. In addition, it had the ability to launch long range missiles against both sea and 
shore targets and it had limited undersea warfare capabilities. The second type of ship 
was a cheaper alternative that could be used to counter a deep-sea submarine threat and 
provide gunfire support against smaller surface combatants. This platform was the Oliver 
Hazard Perry class frigate, the first of which was commissioned in 1977. One additional 
benefit of this cheaper platform was that many of them could be built relatively quickly. 
This resulted in a Navy that could better maintain the needed worldwide presence. 
 However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, it became apparent that 
neither of these platforms nor the newer Arleigh Burke class destroyers could counter the 
threats provided by future opponents. The Navy’s focus had begun to shift towards 
fighting smaller opponents in “brown water” or littoral environments. These primarily 
shallow, coastal environments provided a new set of challenges. The littoral areas can 
easily hide diesel submarines which are extremely difficult to detect. Smaller enemy 
combatants can appear suddenly and move swiftly. Enemies can easily lay a large 
number of mines close to shore. Finally, in the wake of the USS Cole disaster in 2000, a 
need to provide more vigorous anti-terrorism defense arose.  
 These concerns required a ship that could move quickly, defend itself against 
smaller combatants, and operate in shallow water. In addition, this vessel needed the 
ability to fight in a wide variety of environments against different types of threats. The 
Littoral Combat Ship was designed to meet these needs. According to 
GlobalSecurity.org: 
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The LCS is an entirely new breed of U.S. Navy warship. A fast, agile, and 
networked surface combatant, LCS’s modular, focused mission design 
will provide the Combatant Commanders the required war fighting 
capabilities and operational flexibility to ensure maritime dominance and 
access for the joint force. LCS will operate with mission focused packages 
that deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute mission as assigned 
by combatant commanders. [Ref. 5:p. 1]  
 Since the ship is designed to be small, fast, and agile, each one costs significantly 
less than a new Arleigh Burke class destroyer. The capability for modularity enhances 
these cost savings. Rather than build a new ship type for each littoral warfare 
requirement, the LCS is designed to handle each threat through its modular design. 
Essentially, the LCS can get underway with a mission package to hunt mines and then 
return to port, switch to an anti-terrorism mission package, and get underway again to 
perform an entirely different function.  
 One additional, but very significant, cost savings provided by LCS comes through 
minimal manning. While a larger ship with similar capabilities, such as the Oliver 
Hazard Perry class frigate, might have around 200 officers and enlisted onboard, the 
LCS will have, at the most, a total of 50 crewmen. As larger ships are decommissioned 
and replaced by the LCS, one can envision a much smaller need for personnel.  
 About sixty vessels are envisioned under the LCS program. This number will 
keep the Navy over its needed 300 ship minimum and provide large cost savings without 
forcing the Navy to alter its global commitments. The Navy, as a whole, recognizes that 
the DOD budget, as a percentage of federal spending, can be expected to shrink as the 
Congress finds itself spending a larger portion of the Federal Budget on mandatory items 
such as Social Security and Medicare. However, the Navy’s commitments due to the 
Global War on Terror have vastly increased. Therefore, since the LCS appears to be an 
ideal solution to these problems, one may wonder how Congress appropriates money for 
the program. Indeed, one would think that the members of Congress, especially those 
with previous military experience, would work to ensure the LCS program’s success. 
B. COMMITTEE ACTION 
 The actions of relevant House and Senate Committees can shed light on how 
individual Senators and Representatives feel about the program, based on their previous 
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military service. The House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations recently 
received the FY05 Defense Appropriations Bill from the Defense Subcommittee. In this 
bill, the Defense Subcommittee recommended $409 million for the Littoral Combat Ship 
which would provide an increase of $107million over the President’s request [Ref. 6:p. 
3]. Interestingly, the Defense Subcommittee cut $248 million from the President’s 
request to fund the DD(X) program [Ref. 6:p. 3]. This change shows a fundamental shift 
in the way the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee views future shipbuilding. 
While the merits of the LCS have already been discussed, it must be noted that the 
DD(X) is intended to be an expensive replacement for the Arleigh Burke class destroyer.  
 The entire membership of the Defense Subcommittee is as follows: 
  
Defense Subcommittee Party State Years Military Service Branch 
Cunningham Republican CA 21 USN 
Frelinghuysen Republican NJ 2 USA 
Wicker Republican MS 26 USAF/USAFR 
Murtha Democrat PA 38 USMC/USMCR 
Young Republican FL 9 Nat'l Guard 
Lewis Republican CA None None 
Hobson Republican OH None None 
Bonilla Republican TX None None 
Nethercutt Republican WA None None 
Tiahrt Republican KS None None 
Dicks Democrat WA None None 
Sabo Democrat MN None None 
Visclosky Democrat IN None None 
Moran Democrat VA None None 
 
Table 2.1 Membership of House Appropriations Committee Defense 
Subcommittee, 2004. From: [Ref. 7:p. 1801] 
  
In the above table, one can see that the Subcommittee has several members with a 
great deal of military experience. Another item of note is that none of the members have 
a Naval Shipyard in their districts. Representative Wicker, though he is from Mississippi, 
represents District 1 which covers the northern part of the state rather than District 4 
which includes Ingalls Shipbuilding. Representative Moran is from Virginia’s 8th District 
which covers the suburbs of Washington D.C. and is far from Newport News 
Shipbuilding. None of the other members have major shipyards in their states. Therefore, 
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one can infer that the Defense Subcommittee made the decision to cut the DD(X) 
program and add money to the LCS program partially on the basis of their military 
experience (or lack thereof). 
 Though not related to the LCS program, two members of the Defense 
Subcommittee, both with significant military experience, have shown a propensity to 
strengthen defense programs even when there was no foreseeable benefit to their 
constituency. Representative Murtha’s political clout was crucial to adding billions of 
dollars to the President’s request when marking up the FY05 Defense Appropriations 
Bill. [Ref 2:p. 1422] Representative Young, the Chairman of the Appropriations 
Committee, had even discussed adding an additional $10 Billion to the bill. [Ref 2:p. 
1422] 
 The activities of the House Armed Services Committee tell another story, 
however.  
When the House Armed Services Committee reported out its version of 
H.R. 4200, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 
it recommended delays on two Navy shipbuilding programs widely 
viewed as transformational-the DD(X) and the LCS. [Ref 8:p. 3]  
In the report, the Committee expressed several concerns about the future of the 
LCS program. The members question whether the Navy needs sixty new ships as well as 
whether the requirement for these ships is valid. The House Armed Services Committee 
has 46 out of 62 members who have no prior military experience. Of the members that 
were in the military, the following is a summary of their service: 
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Armed Services Committee Party State Years Military Service Branch 
Hunter Republican CA 2 USA 
Marshall Democrat GA 2 USA 
Everett Republican AL 4 USAF 
Gibbons Republican NV 4 USAF 
Wilson Republican NM 7 USAF 
Simmons Republican CT 35 USA/USAR 
Spratt Democrat SC 2 USA 
Ortiz Democrat TX 2 USA 
Evans Democrat IL 2 USMC 
Taylor Democrat MS 13 USCGR 
Shrock Republican VA 4 USN 
Akin Republican MO 8 USAR 
Wilson Republican SC 3 USAR 
Kline Republican MN 25 USMC 
Reyes Democrat TX 2 USA 
Turner Democrat TX 8 USA 
 
Table 2.2. Membership of House Armed Services Committee with 
Military Experience, 2004. From: [Ref. 7:p. 1802] 
  
As one can see, several members of the Armed Services Committee have a 
significant amount of military experience. However, only about 25% of the Committee’s 
membership is composed of people with any prior military experience compared to the 
36% membership of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. In addition, there 
has been no mention of a member of the Armed Services Committee pressing for 
increases in defense spending as Congressman Murtha did before the Defense 
Subcommittee. Since the shipyard which will build LCS has not been determined, no one 
on the committee has a particular interest in preserving a particular yard, though that may 
change in Representative Everett’s case if Bender Shipbuilding in Mobile gets the 
contract. Therefore, one can conclude the lack of military experience in the Armed 
Services Committee may have negatively affected the LCS program. 
C. HOUSE AND SENATE VOTES 
 Several key bills affecting the LCS program, which were passed by the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, proved to have great importance. The ways that 
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individual Senators and Representatives voted on these bills provides additional insight 
into how their military experience may have influenced their votes.  
 The FY2005 Defense Appropriations Bill Conference Report provided full 
funding for the LCS program. [Ref 9:p. 1819] This funding included construction of the 
first LCS. The bill also provided advanced procurement for the DD(X) program. [Ref 9:p. 
1819] This result is interesting because the House Armed Services Committee had 
recommended cutting both programs. Even the House Appropriations Defense 
Subcommittee, which desired to fully fund the LCS program, had moved to cut the 
DD(X) program since the LCS was a better alternative. This bill easily passed both the 
House and Senate. The following members voted “no” on the bill: 
 
Name State Position Party Years Served Years Military Service Branch 
Pete Stark CA Representative Democrat 1972-2004 2 USAF 
John Conyers, Jr. MI Representative Democrat 1964-2004 9 USA/USAR 
Jim McDermott WA Representative Democrat 1988-2004 2 USN 
Raul Grijalva AZ Representative Democrat 2002-2004 None None 
Lynn Woolsey CA Representative Democrat 1992-2004 None None 
Barbara Lee CA Representative Democrat 1998-2004 None None 
Donald Payne NJ Representative Democrat 1988-2004 None None 
Major Owens NY Representative Democrat 1982-2004 None None 
Melvin Watt NC Representative Democrat 1992-2004 None None 
Dennis Kucinich OH Representative Democrat 1996-2004 None None 
 
Table 2.3. House and Senate “No” Votes on Fiscal 2005 Defense 
Appropriations/Conference Report. From: [Ref. 9:p. 1834-1835] 
  
While most of the members in the above table lack military experience, the 
majority of those who voted “yes” on the bill also had little or no previous military 
experience. In addition, the bill requested $25 billion for emergency spending in Iraq. 
Since all of the “no” voters were of the Democratic Party and some of them, such as 
Representative Kucinich, were opposed to the war in Iraq, the “no” votes could have been 
a protest against the war. The way the individual Senators and Representatives voted on 
this bill did not appear to be a product of military experience. Instead, because the bill 
showed significant changes to the LCS program since the committee action, one must 
look at another source in order to discover why certain changes were made. 
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D. SHIPYARD IMPORTANCE 
In order to discover why the changes were made to the DD(X) and LCS 
programs, one must also look at which shipyards were set to build these platforms as well 
as which Senators and Representatives counted these shipyards among their constituency. 
Senators Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins advocated a provision which added funds to 
the DD(X) program and provided advanced funds to Bath Iron Works for building the 
DD(X). [Ref 9, p. 1819] Both Senators are from Maine, the home of Bath Iron Works. 
 Recently, the shipyard has been running into trouble. With the last two Arleigh 
Burke class destroyers scheduled to be finished in 2005, the shipyard does not have any 
future work planned unless it begins construction on the DD(X). [Ref 10:p. 913] If the 
DD(X) program does prove successful, it will be at least two years before the shipyard 
can begin construction. According to Representative Norm Dicks, “if they don’t get the 
work, some of those [yards] will go down.” [Ref 10:p. 913] 
While the LCS did receive its full funding for FY 2005, it did not receive the 
same attention that the DD(X) program received. Perhaps this is more of a function of 
where the ships will be built rather than what are its capabilities. Since LCS will be 
relatively small in size, it does not need to be built in a large shipyard such as Bath Iron 
Works in Maine or Ingalls in Mississippi. Several shipyards are competing for the 
contract including Bender Shipbuilding and Repair in Mobile AL, a Norwegian shipyard 
named Umoe Mandal, Textron Systems in New Orleans LA, and a joint shipyard from 
Northrop Grumman and Kockums of Sweden. [Ref 11:p. 517] Given the number of 
smaller shipyards and foreign competitors, it is not surprising that Congress will not 
provide advanced funding for the program. 
One factor that may change this is that the larger shipyards are forming 
partnerships with some of the smaller yards and lobbying Congress for advanced funding. 
[Ref 11:p.517] However, since the contract to build the LCS has not been awarded, 
Congress is unlikely to provide advanced funding for these ships at the same monetary 






























III. THE MINE COUNTERMEASURES SHIP (MCM-1) 
A. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
The Avenger class mine countermeasures ship was designed to both hunt and 
sweep enemy mines in littoral environments. After the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in the 
1980’s, the Navy realized a need to conduct mine hunting operations in the Persian Gulf. 
Generally, ships had to be concerned with both contact mines that were moored in 
shallow water as well as contact mines that had broken free of their mooring.  
After the Gulf War, the Navy recognized that newer mines were becoming much 
more prominent. These mines could be laid on the ocean bottom and had characteristics 
which made them much more difficult to detect. These newer mines were often smaller in 
size and had different types of sensors such as acoustic and seismic sensors.  
The Avenger class ship was designed to counter this variety of mine warfare 
threats. Avenger class ships are capable minesweepers in that they can deploy traditional 
cable cutters as well as acoustic sweeping gear. In addition, these ships can conduct mine 
hunting operations through the use of sonar and video systems, cable cutters from a mine 
neutralization vehicle, and mine detonating devices that can be released and exploded by 
remote control. [Ref 12:p. 1] 
A total of fourteen Avenger class ships were built. Most have been stationed in 
Ingleside, Texas. Two of the ships have been permanently deployed to Sasebo, Japan and 
two have been permanently deployed to Manama, Bahrain. All ships were built by either 
Peterson Shipbuilders in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, or by Marinette Marine in Marinette, 
Wisconsin. These shipyards are smaller than both Ingalls Shipbuilding and Bath Iron 
Works and are not owned by Grumman or General Dynamics. 
Unlike most Navy ships, these minesweepers were built with numerous 
components procured outside the United States. In fact, the Avenger class was designed 
to be a NATO platform. For example, in twelve of the ships, all four of the main engines 
and all three of the diesel generators were purchased from Isotta Franchini in Italy. The 
principal mine hunting device, the crane that places the mine neutralization vehicle in the 
water, was procured from another Italian manufacturer. The wood and fiberglass hull was 
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derived from an Italian design. Finally, numerous engineering components were designed 
in Germany. In fact, many replacement parts for these ships must be obtained from either 
a sole source manufacturer in Europe or, in Isotta Franchini’s case, from a subsidiary 
located near Ingleside, Texas.  
Therefore, these ships were unusual for two reasons. First, the multinational 
nature of their procurement reflected a relationship with allied nations. Secondly, since 
these ships were built by smaller shipyards, one might not see as much Congressional 
lobbying to provide their funding. 
B. COMMITTEE ACTION 
 In 1989, the Senate Appropriations Committee made significant changes to the 
FY 1990 Appropriations Bill. Among these changes was the funding of an additional 
Avenger class mine sweeper. The Appropriations Committee funded two minesweepers 
($198 million) instead of the one requested ($120 million). [Ref 13:p. 762] A list of the 
members of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time follows: 
 




Daniel Inouye HI Democrat 4 USA 
Ernest Hollings SC Democrat 3 USA 
J. Bennett Johnston LA Democrat 3 USA 
James Sasser TN Democrat 6 USMCR 
Dennis DeConcini AZ Democrat 8 USA/USAR 
Dale Bumpers AR Democrat 3 USMC 
Frank Lautenberg NJ Democrat 4 USA 
Tom Harkin IA Democrat 8 USN/USNR 
Brock Adams WA Democrat 2 USN 
Wyche Fowler GA Democrat 2 USA 
Robert Kerrey NE Democrat 3 USN 
Mark Hatfield OR Republican 3 USN 
Ted Stevens AK Republican 3 USAF 
James McClure ID Republican 2 USN WWII 
Jacob Garn UT Republican 4 USN 
Thad Cochran MS Republican 2 USN 
Robert Kasten, Jr. WI Republican 5 USAF 
Warren Rudman NH Republican 2 USA Korea 
Arlen Specter PA Republican 2 USAF 
Robert Byrd WV Democrat None None 
Quentin Burdick ND Democrat None None 
Patrick Leahy VT Democrat None None 
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Barbara Mikulski MD Democrat None None 
Harry Reid NV Democrat None None 
Alfonse D'Amato NY Republican None None 
Pete Domenici NM Republican None None 
Charles Grassley IA Republican None None 
Don Nickles OK Republican None None 
Phil Gramm TX Republican None None 
 
Table 3.1. Membership of Senate Appropriations Committee and 
Military Experience, 1989. From: [Ref. 13:p. 37-E] 
 
As one can see, the members of the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1989 
had a good deal of military experience. None of the members appears to have spent a 
career in the military. Senators Harkin and DeConcini had the longest terms with eight 
years of service each. However, 65% of the committee’s members did have some 
experience, with many having served in WWII and Korea. One can also notice that a 
significant portion of the members had served in the Navy, with Senator Harkin among 
them.  
Therefore, from this example, one can infer that military experience did appear to 
have an impact on the way that the Senate Appropriations Committee members voted. 
The fact that many served in the Navy, especially during periods when mine warfare was 
a critical mission area, may help explain why they included an extra minesweeper in the 
FY 1990 Appropriations Bill. It is also likely that Senator Kasten may have influenced 
the vote since the ships are built in his home state: Wisconsin. The House Appropriations 
Committee members made no changes to the number of minesweepers when they 
reviewed the bill 
In contrast, the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee treated this program 
much differently the next year. In the FY 1991 Appropriations Bill, the committee voted 
to fund only two mine sweepers ($204 million) instead of the three requested ($268 




Name State Party 
Years Military 
Service Branch 
Norm Dicks WA Democrat None None 
Bill Hefner NC Democrat None None 
Martin Olav 
Sabo MN Democrat None None 
Joseph McDade PA Republican None None 
Clarence Miller OH Republican None None 
John Murtha PA Democrat 38 USMC/USMCR 
Charles Wilson TX Democrat 4 USN 
Les AuCoin OR Democrat 3 USA 
Julian Dixon CA Democrat 3 USA 
Bill Young FL Republican 9 Nat'l Guard 
Bob Livingston LA Republican 2 USN 
   
Table 3.2. House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, 1990. From: 
[Ref. 13:p. 38-E] 
 
Approximately 55% of the subcommittee members had previous military 
experience, with Representative Murtha having spent a great deal of time in the Marine 
Corps. With the amount of military experience present in this subcommittee, one may 
question why they voted to cut the Avenger program. Apparently, the program was 
beginning to have problems. According to a Senate conference report, there were delays 
in constructing the ships that had been previously ordered. [Ref. 14:p. 825] 
While the Defense Subcommittee voted to cut the program, there appears to be 
logical reasoning behind the members’ decision. If a shipyard had received funds for 
previous ships but had been unable to produce the product, then it made little sense to 
send that shipyard more money. Therefore, military experience helped inform the 
Defense Subcommittee’s judgment. None of the members had political ties to the 
shipyards since none of them had a constituency in Wisconsin. The only part of the 
process that appeared to be motivated by constituency was Representative AuCoin’s 
request that the slowdown not affect the Navy’s decision to base these ships in Astoria 
Oregon, his home state. [Ref. 14:p. 819]  
 
 
C. HOUSE AND SENATE VOTES 
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 Though the committee actions showed interesting results, the FY 1990 Defense 
Appropriations Bills showed inconclusive results. The passage of the bill appropriated 
$286 billion for defense which was a $2 billion decrease from the President’s request. 
[Ref 13:p. 72-H] This bill included the Senate Appropriations Committee’s extra mine 
sweeper.  
 Of the 417 Representatives who voted on the FY 1990 Defense Appropriations 
Bill, 105 voted “No.” [Ref 13:p. 72-H] Those with significant military experience voted 
both “Yes” and “No” on the Appropriations Bill. Instead, votes seemed to be more in 
favor of party loyalties. Therefore, it would be very difficult to say whether previous 
military experience affected the bill’s passage. One interesting item of note is that, while 
most Representatives from Wisconsin voted against the Appropriations Bill, 
Representative Roth voted for its passage. His district included the two builders for the 
Avenger class mine hunter. 
 One must look more closely at the FY 1990 Appropriations Bill’s cuts as well as 
the political situation in Congress in order to determine what happened. At the time, the 
Democratic Party held the House majority. The Defense Appropriations Bill included 
drastic cuts to several Reagan-era strategic weapons programs. The B-2 “stealth” bomber 
program was cut from three requested to two appropriated. [Ref 13:p. 765]. The Strategic 
Defense Initiative program Research and Development funding was cut from $4.6 billion 
to $3.5 billion. [Ref 13:p. 765] Therefore, it appears that the House Republicans did not 
desire these cuts and voted “No” to the bill. 
 When the same bill had been previously passed by the Senate, the results were 
different. The Senate had only cut $300 million from the President’s request and passed 
the bill to appropriate $288.4 billion for DOD programs. [Ref 13:p. 41-S] Only two 
Senators voted “No” on the bill’s passage: Senator Conrad (D) from North Dakota and 
Senator Hatfield (R) from Oregon. [Ref 13:p. 41-S] Senator Conrad had no previous 
military experience and Senator Hatfield had served for three years in the Navy. Since the 
96 other Senators who voted “Yes” on the bill had various backgrounds, it is impossible 
to say with any certainty whether military experience had any effect on their votes.  
 When the FY 1991 Defense Appropriations Bill was passed, it included none of 
the $268 million requested for the three minesweepers. [Ref. 14:p. 826]. When the House 
of Representatives passed the bill, there were no identifiable trends among those with or 
without military experience. However, the following represents the votes from Oregon 
(where the ships were supposed to be homeported) and Wisconsin (where the ships were 
built): 
    
Name State Party Vote 
Years Military 
Service Branch 
Les AuCoin OR Democrat Yes 3 USA 
Denny Smith OR Republican Yes 9 USAF 
Peter DeFazio OR Democrat No 4 USAF 
Gerald Kleczka  WI Democrat Yes 6 Air Nat'l Guard 
Toby Roth WI Republican No 7 USAR 
Ron Wyden OR Democrat No None None 
Robert Smith OR Republican Yes None None 
Les Aspin WI Democrat Yes None None 
Robert Kastenmeier WI Democrat Yes None None 
Steve Gunderson WI Republican No None None 
Jim Moody WI Democrat Yes None None 
Thomas Petri WI Republican No None None 
David Obey WI Democrat Yes None None 
James Sensenbrenner, 
Jr. WI Republican No None None 
Table 3.3. Oregon and Wisconsin Representatives’ FY 1990 Defense 
Appropriations Bill Votes. From: [Ref. 14:p. 147-H] 
  
Representative AuCoin voted “Yes” on the bill after having received assurances 
that his district would be the homeport for at least two minesweepers. However, there is 
no discernable pattern in how the rest of Oregon’s Representatives voted. Those with and 
without military experience as well as Democrats and Republicans voted both ways.  
In Wisconsin, Representative Roth voted against the bill. This is not surprising 
since the lost funding for the MCM program directly affected his district. With that 
exception, however, like Oregon, there is no discernable pattern among those who voted 
on the Defense Appropriations Bill.  
There was also no apparent pattern when the Senate voted on the Defense 
Appropriations Bill after the Committee reported out later that year. The bill was adopted 
 22
 23
80-17 and cut $19 billion from the President’s request. [Ref 14:p. 62-S] Among those 
who voted “No” on the bill, only one was from Wisconsin. Senator Kohl, who voted to 
pass the bill, had actually served six years in the Army Reserve. However, since the 
remaining Senators who voted “No” had various levels of military experience, it cannot 
be proven that previous military experience had any effect on this bill’s passage.  
D. SHIPYARD IMPORTANCE 
As far as constituency is concerned, where the ships were built did not seem to 
have as much impact on the House and Senate votes as the locations did in Mississippi 
and Maine. While the individual Representatives appeared to vote in favor of their 
constituency, the Representatives from outside Wisconsin’s 8th District did not 
necessarily vote the same way. Wisconsin’s Senators also did not necessarily vote in 
favor of the two involved shipyards. The reasons are likely due to the shipyards’ 
capabilities and the size of the Navy contracts. 
The shipyards in Maine and Mississippi are designed to produce larger Navy 
vessels. For this reason, the shipyards invested large sums of money in the equipment 
needed to build these ships. In addition, since the components of these vessels are so 
large, a shipyard almost has to dedicate itself to fulfilling Navy contracts. When the 
shipyard stops receiving contracts it could be facing bankruptcy. The changing personnel 
requirements and the need for new equipment can be too much for the yard to handle. 
In contrast, the smaller shipyards such as Peterson and Marinette do not have the 
same problems. Since minesweepers are, at the most, 224 feet long, the shipyard does not 
have to dedicate itself to producing one ship at a time. The size of the minesweepers also 
means that the shipyard does not have to invest vast sums of capital on shipyard 
infrastructure.  
The dollar amounts of the contracts are significantly different as well. Since a 
minesweeper costs approximately $90 million compared to the $1.2 billion required for 
an Arleigh Burke class destroyer, the shipyard does not face as much risk as a larger 
shipyard. Cost overruns are less likely to hurt the business and, since the amount of profit 
is relatively small, the shipyard is less likely to focus solely on Navy contracts.  
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When Congress appropriates less money for a ship built in a smaller yard, there is 
lesser effect on a Representative’s or Senator’s constituency. The shipyard does not 
necessarily go out of business because it can continue performing work for other 
customers. As a result, the loss of a Navy contract does not necessarily mean that the 






















IV. THE AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT DOCK (LPD 17) 
A. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 The San Antonio class amphibious transport dock was designed as the next 
generation of amphibious ship. With the advent of the “Sea Base” concept, the Navy 
recognized a need to create an amphibious ship that could perform a variety of missions. 
The idea of Sea Basing is to place power projection forces and equipment at sea rather 
than at a land facility. The LPD 17 was an ideal platform for this role. Essentially, the 
LPD 17 was designed to embark, transport, sea base and land elements of a landing force 
for various expeditionary warfare missions. [Ref. 15:p. 1] 
 The San Antonio class ship was designed to replace most other amphibious ships 
by combining their functions into one platform. These ships can land Marines ashore by 
using Landing Craft Air Cushion Vehicles (LCACs) or by using more traditional landing 
craft. In addition, the LPD 17 has the capability to use both helicopters and vertical take 
off and landing aircraft. These airframes can land Marine and special operations units as 
well as provide air support.  
 The first of these ships began construction in August 2000 and was more than 
80% complete by the end of 2003. [Ref 15:p. 1] The keels of the next four ships in the 
class were laid soon after the LPD 17 began construction. Eventually, as the requested 12 
ships in the class are built, the older Navy amphibious ships will be decommissioned. 
This will produce an overall cost savings as these 12 ships replace over 40 older units 
(LPD 4, LSD 36, LKA 113, and LST 1179 classes). [Ref 15:p. 1] 
 These ships are being built by the Northrop Grumman Shipyard in Avondale, 
Louisiana. According to the Navy Fact File: 
The lead ship contract contained options for New Orleans (FY 1999) and 
one of the FY 2000 follow-on ships, Mesa Verde (LPD 19) and Green Bay 
(LPD 20). These options were exercised in December 1998 and February 
2000. The Navy awarded the contract to build New York (LPD 21), in 
November 2003. [Ref 15:p.1]  
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This shipyard, unlike Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding, works on both 
Navy and civilian contracts. Even though the LPD 17 is a large vessel, Avondale has 
little trouble shifting its facilities to producing merchant vessels. The loss of a Navy 
contract will probably not put the shipyard out of business. However, Northrop Grumman 
also owns the Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Though these ships are being 
built in Louisiana, it is possible that the Senators and Representatives from Mississippi 
support the program because Northrop Grumman’s financial stability can impact the 
Mississippi yard. Therefore, politics can be more of an issue than they were for the MCM 
1 program.  
B. COMMITTEE ACTION 
 Like the Avenger class, the initial San Antonio class ships faced development 
problems which delayed the production of the initial units. The LPD 17 was supposed to 
be the first ship designed using three dimensional computer aided design. While the idea 
was conceived to generate cost savings, the shipyard had great difficulty translating the 
three dimensional models into a workable product. Unlike the case of the MCM 1 
program, these delays did not necessarily cause reduced funding. 
 First, the Senate Appropriations Committee deferred spending on the first two 
ships of the class in 2000 due to cost overruns and scheduling delays. [Ref. 16:p. 2-42] 
This seems similar to the way Congress responded to the delays in MCM 1 procurement. 
However, unlike the case with the Avenger class program, the Appropriations Committee 
included provisions to appropriate some money for the shipyard. They included $268 
million to cover the overruns and $200 million in advanced procurement for the two 
ships. [Ref. 16:p. 2-42] Though this was a fraction of the cost of each ship 
(approximately $1 billion each), this policy represents a significant change from other 
programs.  
 The Senate Appropriations Committee members had a great deal of military 








Thad Cochran MS Republican 2 USN 
Arlen Specter PA Republican 2 USAF 
Slade Gordon WA Republican 29 USA/USAF/USAFR 
Conrad Burns MT Republican 2 USMC 
Robert Bennett UT Republican 3 Nat'l Guard 
Ben Campbell CO Republican 2 USAF 
Larry Craig ID Republican 4 Nat'l Guard 
Lauch Faircloth NC Republican 1 USA 
Daniel Inouye HI Democrat 4 USA 
Ernest Hollings SC Democrat 3 USA 
Dale Bumpers AR Democrat 3 USMC 
Frank 
Lautenberg NJ Democrat 4 USA 
Tom Harkin IA Democrat 8 USN/USNR 
Herb Kohl WI Democrat 6 USAR 
Pete Domenici NM Republican None None 
Christopher 
Bond MO Republican None None 
Mitch 
McConnell KY Republican None None 
Richard Shelby AL Republican None None 
Judd Gregg NH Republican None None 
Kay Hutchinson TX Republican None None 
Robert Byrd WV Democrat None None 
Patrick Leahy VT Democrat None None 
Barbara 
Mikulski MD Democrat None None 
Harry Reid NV Democrat None None 
Patty Murray WA Democrat None None 
Byron Dorgan ND Democrat None None 
Barbara Boxer CA Democrat None None 
  
Table 4.1. Senate Appropriations Committee, 2000. From: [Ref. 17:p. 
1607] 
 
 Of the 27 members in the Senate Appropriations Committee, 52% had previous 
military experience. Though most had only a few years of experience, one member had 
served an entire career in the Army and Air Force. Interestingly, only two members had 
spent time in the Navy. Therefore, it is possible that these members made a sound 
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decision to delay the program based on their military experience. This assumption is 
supported by similar committee actions on other shipbuilding programs.  
 One key difference is the appropriation of some advanced money for Ingalls 
Shipbuilding. Perhaps this was not a function of the members’ military experience but, 
rather, a nod to Senator Cochran. All LPD 17 class ships were supposed to be built in his 
home state of Mississippi. Though the ships were eventually built by the same company 
in Avondale, Louisiana, at the time the Mississippi shipyard was planning to begin 
construction and needed a certain amount of cash in order to remain operational. 
C. HOUSE AND SENATE VOTES 
 The House and Senate votes on the passed FY 2001 Appropriations Bill shed 
further light on whether or not military experience played a part in the funding for LPD 
17. By the time the Appropriations Bill reached the Senate, cost overruns had become 
more of an issue. The Senate voted to cut $1 billion from the $1.5 billion requested for 
the fifth and sixth ships of the class. [Ref 16:p. 2-48] The thinking behind this policy was 
very similar to the way that the Senate Appropriations Committee handled the issue. The 
shipyard was simply not producing and it did not make economic sense to keep paying 
for more units. 
 The Senate also denied the Appropriations Committee’s request for the money to 
cover cost overruns and advanced procurement. Instead, the bill authorized the DOD to 
shift $300 million already appropriated for other programs to cover the shipbuilding 
programs. [Ref. 16:p. 2-48] In other words, Congress pulled money from other programs 
to cover the cost overruns rather than giving the program new money.  
 The following table discusses the votes from the FY 2001 Appropriations Bill. 
When the bill reached this stage, the conferees had continued to allow the Navy to 
transfer the needed funds and they only approved $561 million for the fifth and sixth 
units. [Ref 16:p. 251] This was an enormous reduction over the previously requested $1.5 








John McCain AZ Senator Republican 22 USN 
Chuck Hagel NE Senator Republican 1 USA 
Barbara Boxer CA Senator Democrat None  
Wayne Allard CO Senator Republican None None 
Paul Wellstone MN Senator Democrat None None 
George 
Voinovich OH Senator Republican None None 
Phil Gramm TX Senator Republican None None 
Russell Feingold WI Senator Democrat None None 
Michael Enzi WY Senator Republican None None 
 
Table 4.2. Senate FY 2001 Defense Appropriations Bill “No” votes, 2000. 
From: [Ref. 16:p. S-41] 
 
 Two interesting patterns emerge from the Appropriations Bill vote. First, with the 
exception of Senator McCain, there is an overall lack of military experience among the 
“No” voters. Some of these members have shown some lack of support for Defense 
Appropriation Bills in the past, but that lack of support was never consistent. For 
example, Senators Gramm and McCain voted “No” on the FY 2002 Appropriations Bill 
the next year. [Ref 18:p. 3111] Senators Feingold and Boxer had voted “No” on the 
Defense Authorization Bill in 1996. [Ref. 19:p. S-34] However, they voted in favor of 
defense spending in other years. Senator McCain has a long history of voting “No” on 
defense bills where wasted money is an issue. In this case, one could say that his military 
experience gave him a dislike of cost overruns. For the other Senators who voted “No” on 
this bill, there appears to be little direct link between their lack of military experience and 
their voting tendencies. The Senators who voted “Yes” on this bill had various military 
and civilian backgrounds, leading one to believe that military experience had little to do 
with their vote. Therefore, it appears that those with and without military experience have 
strong feelings about defense.  
 Another interesting aspect of this vote is that both Senators from Mississippi 
voted “Yes” on a bill which drastically cut funding to Litton Industries in Pascagoula, 
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Mississippi. Both Senators had lobbied to get some money for the shipyard. In fact, 
Senator Cochran had ardently supported the advanced funding for the first LPD 17 class 
ship, even though the design and construction schedules had not been finalized. [Ref. 16: 
p. 2-48] Therefore, it appears that the Senators, realizing that the program would be cut, 
came to a compromise where the shipyard would get some money. After the compromise 
was reached, they supported the bill. 
 Many Representatives who had voted “No” on other defense appropriation bills, 
such as the FY 2005 bill, also voted “No” on the FY 2001 Defense Appropriations Bill: 
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Name State Position Party 
Years Military 
Service Branch 
Pete Stark CA Representative Democrat 2 USAF 
John Conyers, Jr. MI Representative Democrat 9 USA/USAR 
Jim McDermott WA Representative Democrat 2 USN 
Lynn Woolsey CA Representative Democrat None None 
Barbara Lee CA Representative Democrat None None 
Donald Payne NJ Representative Democrat None None 
Major Owens NY Representative Democrat None None 
Melvin Watt NC Representative Democrat None None 
Dennis Kucinich OH Representative Democrat None None 
 
Table 4.3. House of Representatives FY 2001 and FY 2005 Defense 
Appropriations Bill “No” votes, 2000. From: [Ref. 16:p. 1821 and Table 2.3] 
 
 Certainly, the issues that were present in 2000 which may have caused some 
Representatives to not support defense appropriations were not present in 2004. The 
important distinctions arise from the “No” votes during these years. First, there is a lack 
of military experience among some of those who voted against defense measures more 
than once. Only Representative Conyers had a significant amount of service in the 
military. Those who consistently do not support defense measures also appear to be from 
the Democratic Party. Therefore, one can see a correlation between military service and 
voting on defense appropriations on these two bills. However, the same members did not 
always show a lack of support for defense spending between 2001 and 2005. While there 
is some pattern of lack of military spending support, the pattern is not particularly strong. 
In addition, the number of Representatives who vote against defense appropriations more 
than once is not large enough to make any kind of drastic difference in a bill’s passage.  
D. SHIPYARD IMPORTANCE 
 Instead, the health of the Ingalls Shipyard appeared to be the primary driver 
behind the LPD 17 class appropriations. The lobbying efforts of both Mississippi senators 
have been discussed. As of 2004, the ships were being built by a subsidiary in Avondale. 
However, at the time of the FY 2001 Appropriations Bill, the plan was for Ingalls to build 
most of the platforms. If the program was to be delayed, then the Senators had some very 
real reasons for concern.  
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A large portion of Ingalls’ future work was to be on amphibious ships. The yard 
was scheduled to complete one LPD 17 class ship each year from FY 2005 until FY 
2009. [Ref.10:p. 913] Since Ingalls is a shipyard dedicated to producing large vessels for 
the Navy, it is designed to produce only three units per year. Each ship represents a very 
large part of the year’s revenue. For example, Ingalls was scheduled to produce an 
Arleigh Burke class, a DD(X) and an LPD 17 in FY 2005. [Ref 10:p. 913] The problem 
appeared worse in the out years as the shipyard was scheduled to produce only two units 
per year: one each of the LHD 8 class and the LPD 17 class. [Ref. 10:p. 913] Therefore, a 
loss of LPD 17 dollars meant that the shipyard would have to, at a minimum, begin 
laying off workers.  
There was also a concern that the delay of the LPD 17 program could have 
damaged the country’s industrial base. This would have left the nation with only three 
major shipyards: Newport News in Virginia, Electric Boat in Connecticut, and Bath Iron 
Works in Maine. The problem would have been compounded by the fact that Newport 
News specialized in building aircraft carriers, Bath Iron Works specialized in building 
destroyers, and Electric Boat specialized in building submarines. This would have left 
few other places to build future amphibious ships. Therefore, it appeared to be in the 
Mississippi Senators’ best interests to keep the shipyard open, regardless of how bad the 













V. THE ARLEIGH BURKE CLASS DESTROYER (DDG 51) 
A. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 
 Few other ship classes have experienced as rich a history as the Arleigh Burke 
class. Originally designed in the 1980’s to fight a blue water battle against Communist 
enemies, it has evolved into the primary Navy platform for operations in support of the 
Global War on Terror. The first DDG 51 class destroyer was commissioned in 1991. 
These ships are still being built as of 2004. The Arleigh Burke provides the Navy with 
capabilities in several mission areas. 
Destroyers primarily perform anti-submarine warfare duty while guided 
missile destroyers are multi-mission [Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)] surface 
combatants. The addition of the Mk-41 Vertical Launch System has 
greatly expanded the role of the destroyer in strike warfare. [Ref 20:p. 1]     
 During the 1980’s, the Navy’s destroyers were getting increasing old. In addition, 
the success of the Aegis radar system on the Ticonderoga class cruisers showed that this 
system would be necessary on future ships. This system allowed a ship to provide area 
defense against incoming enemy missiles. In addition, the Vertical Launch System could 
be outfitted with Tomahawk missiles to fulfill a strike role.  
 The Ticonderoga class met these requirements, but a new class of ship was 
needed to take advantage of technological advancements in ship structure. The DDG-51 
had an unusual superstructure which was designed to present a smaller profile against 
enemy radar. In addition, the ship was designed with greater chemical, biological, and 
radiological defense capabilities as it became clearer that these weapons would be seen in 
a future war.  
 As the ship class matured, additional enhancements were added to the newer 
units. The additional of helicopter capabilities gave the DDG-51 class more robust anti-
submarine and anti-surface warfare capabilities. Upgraded 5” guns also gave the ships a 
greater surface fire support capability. These enhancements helped to keep the class  
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relevant after the Cold War had ended. The smaller radar profile, helicopter capabilities, 
and improved Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capabilities would also be useful in a 
littoral environment.  
 By 2004, over fifty of these vessels have been built, creating a great number of 
Aegis platforms that could be deployed all over the world. Most of these ships are based 
in the continental United States with some units in Pearl Harbor and some forward 
deployed to Yokosuka, Japan. Each ship of the Arleigh Burke class was built in either 
Pascagoula, Mississippi or Bath, Maine.   
B. COMMITTEE ACTION 
 A study of the FY 1989 Appropriations Bill provides useful insights into how 
Congress treated this program and why Congress appropriated certain dollar amounts. At 
that time, the United States still had great concerns about a potential war with the Soviet 
Union. The CG 47 class cruiser was being built, but there were not enough Aegis ships in 
production to meet the Navy’s needs. The Navy wanted enough Aegis platforms to 
protect each carrier battle group when that battle group deployed. The problem was so 
pronounced that, even if the Navy budgeted for five Aegis destroyers annually, it would 
face a shortage of anti-aircraft capable platforms throughout the 1990’s as the older 
destroyers were decommissioned. [Ref 21:p. 653] 
When the FY 1989 Appropriations Bill was reviewed by both the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees, the DDG 51 received full, if not enthusiastic, 
support. The House Appropriations Committee supported the President’s request for a 
vigorous shipbuilding program. The panel wanted the Navy to have a total of 580 ships 
by the end of FY 1989. [Ref 21:p. 662] This did not fully meet the President’s request for 
a 600 ship Navy, but, compared to the size of the fleet after the Cold War, Congress 
seemed very supportive of shipbuilding programs in general. 
However, the House Appropriations Committee had noticed that, historically, the 
Navy had been asking for more advanced procurement dollars than were actually needed. 
Citing this reason, the committee approved the Navy’s request to build three Aegis 
destroyers in FY 1989 but it cut the Navy’s request for advanced procurement dollars. 
The Navy requested $78.4 million for parts for ships to be bought in FY 1990 and 1991, 
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but the committee allowed only $5.5 million for advanced procurement while it approved 
$2.13 billion to buy the three ships in FY 1989. [Ref 21:p. 662] 
Of the 77 members of the House Appropriations Committee, 32 members had 
prior military experience. [Ref 21:p. 45-F] Of the members who had military experience, 
only one had served a career in the military and only 4 had more than six years of service. 
Most of the remaining 27 members with military service had served in either World War 
II or Korea for less than two years. Interestingly, 20 of the 35 Democrats on the 
committee had prior military service. Since the majority of committee members were 
Democrats, Representative Murtha among them, previous military experience may have 
played a role in their decision.  
The Senate Appropriations Committee showed greater support for the program. 
The committee voted to buy five Arleigh Burke-class destroyers for a total cost of $3.5 
billion with $395 million of that money being dollars that were appropriated in previous 
years but never spent. [Ref 21:p. 670] This change represented an increase of two ships 
over the President’s request. Incidentally, Senator Stennis from Mississippi was the 





Name State Party Years Military Service Branch 
John Stennis MS Democrat None None 
Robert Byrd WV Democrat None None 
William Proxmire WI Democrat None None 
Quentin Burdick ND Democrat None None 
Patrick Leahy VT Democrat None None 
Barbara Mikulski MD Democrat None None 
Harry Reid NV Democrat None None 
Alfonse D'Amato NY Republican None None 
Pete Domenici NM Republican None None 
Charles Grassley IA Republican None None 
Don Nickles OK Republican None None 
Daniel Inouye HI Democrat 4 USA 
Ernest Hollings SC Democrat 3 USA 
Lawson Chiles FL Democrat 1 USA Korea 
J. Bennett Johnston LA Democrat 3 USA 
James Sasser TN Democrat 6 USMCR 
Dennis DeConcini AZ Democrat 8 USA/USAR 
Dale Bumpers AR Democrat 3 USMC 
Frank Lautenberg NJ Democrat 4 USA 
Tom Harkin IA Democrat 8 USN/USNR 
Mark Hatfield OR Republican 3 USN 
Ted Stevens AK Republican 3 USAF 
Lowell Weicker, Jr. CT Republican 2 USA 
James McClure ID Republican 2 USN WWII 
Jacob Garn UT Republican 4 USN 
Thad Cochran MS Republican 2 USN 
Robert Kasten, Jr. WI Republican 5 USAF 
Warren Rudman NH Republican 1 USA Korea 
Arlen Specter PA Republican 2 USAF 
 
Table 5.1. Senate Appropriations Committee Members, 1988. From: 
[Ref. 21:p. 22-F] 
 
 Of the 29 members of the committee, 18 had some military service. None had 
more than eight years of service, but four members had served in the Navy with Senator 
Harkin having served the longest. One could say that military service likely played a role 
in the decision to build two more destroyers. However, with both Senators from 
Mississippi on the Appropriations Committee, it seems very likely that the increase was 
designed to help the shipyard in Pascagoula. 
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C. HOUSE AND SENATE VOTES 
 When the FY 1989 Defense Appropriations Bill was passed, the Senate 
Appropriations Committee’s changes remained in effect. The President had initially 
asked for $2.207 billion in order to procure three Aegis destroyers. [Ref 21:p. 665] When 
the bill was passed, Congress appropriated $2.5 billion to build five Aegis destroyers. 
[Ref 21:p. 665] In addition to appropriating this amount, Congress directed the Navy to 
spend $1 billion on the additional ships using money that was appropriated for programs 
in prior years but was not spent. [Ref 21:p. 665]  
This shift represents a great degree of support for this program. The House of 
Representatives overwhelmingly supported the bill with only 53 members voting against 
it. [Ref 21:p. 64-65 H] Of these 53 members, 32 had no previous military experience. Of 
the remaining members who voted against the bill, none had more than nine years of 
military experience with most having less than two years experience. Therefore, a 
correlation between military experience and voting may exist, but this correlation had 
little effect on the bill’s passage. 
Some members who voted against the bill have shown patterns of voting against 
defense spending more than once. For example, the following shows members who voted 
against the FY 1989 Defense Appropriations Bill and against the FY 1991 Defense 
Appropriations Conference Report: 
 
 Name State Party Years Military Service Branch 
Ronald Dellums CA Democrat 2 USMC 
Pete Stark CA Democrat 2 USAF 
Gus Savage IL Democrat 2 
USA 
WWII 
George Miller CA Democrat None None 
Patricia Schroeder CO Democrat None None 
Gordon Smith OR Republican None None 
Larry Combest TX Republican None None 
Thomas Petri WI Republican None None 
James Sensenbrenner, Jr. WI Republican None None 
 
Table 5.2. House of Representatives FY 1989 and FY 1991 Defense 
Appropriations “Nay” Votes, 1988 and 1990. From: [Ref. 21:p. 64-65 H and Ref. 
22:p. 16-17 H] 
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 There is a distinct lack of military experience among these members. Of the three 
that did have experience, none had more than two years. Representatives Petri and 
Sensenbrenner, in particular, stand out because, as discussed previously, they had voted 
against appropriations that were beneficial to their constituents. It could be their lack of 
military experience played a role in this decision. However, the numbers of people in this 
category are not enough to greatly affect a bill’s passage and, while they may vote against 
defense spending more often, they voting patterns are not consistent. 
 The FY 1989 Defense Appropriations Bill easily passed through the Senate. Only 
four members voted against the bill:  
 
Name State Party Years Military Service Branch 
Kent Conrad ND Democrat None None 
William Proxmire WI Democrat None None 
Mark Hatfield OR Republican 3 USN 
Claiborne Pell RI  Democrat 37 USCG/USCGR 
 
Table 5.3. Senate FY 1989 Defense Appropriations “Nay” Votes, 1988. 
From: [Ref. 21:p. 49 S] 
 Of the four “Nay” votes, two members had military service. Senator Pell had 
actually served an entire career in the Coast Guard. By looking here, one cannot see 
much correlation between military service and voting patterns. However, these same 
people have some history of voting against defense spending, even when their party 
appeared to be for defense. Senators Conrad, Hatfield, and Pell, for example, voted 
against two defense spending bills in 1991. [Ref 23:p. 28-S] These Senators did not have 
consistent patterns of voting against defense, though, since they supported defense 
spending in other years.  
 The Senators who do appear to be against defense spending come from various 
backgrounds. In the above example, the three Senators who vote consistently against 
defense spending have no military experience, some military experience, and a military 
career, respectively. Therefore, Senators’ level of military experience did not appear to 
affect defense spending, overall. In the case of the Arleigh Burke-class, this does not 
appear to be much correlation between Senate military experience and how much money 
is appropriated to the program. 
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D. SHIPYARD IMPORTANCE 
 Though House and Senate military experience may not have greatly affected the 
DDG-51 program, where the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers were built had a great effect 
on the program’s appropriations. Bath Iron Works, which has produced about half of the 
ships, is Maine’s second largest employer. [Ref 10: p. 912] The shipyard which has 
produced the remainder of the ships, Ingalls Shipyard, employs about 10,000 people and 
is Mississippi’s second largest employer.  [Ref 10: p. 912] Though Senators and 
Representatives have repeatedly lobbied for their respective constituencies, the 
competition between these two yards for the same Navy contracts has had a greater 
influence on this program’s appropriations than on the appropriations for the LPD-17, 
MCM-1, or LCS. 
 Since the early 1990’s, the Navy has given each yard an equal number of Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyers. [Ref 10: p. 912] Naturally, the shipyards are competitive with 
each other for these contracts, but the involved Senators and Representatives have 
brokered an equitable solution. According to an article by John Donnelly, the Maine and 
Mississippi congressional delegations prefer that each state gets what it wants and that no 
one gets hurt. [Ref 10: p. 912] However, the gradual reductions in the number of ordered 
Aegis destroyers and problems with its replacement, the DD(X), have changed this 
distribution. 
 Since 1993, Bath Iron Works has focused solely on building destroyers. [Ref 10: 
p. 913] Therefore, it was properly equipped to begin construction on the first DD(X). The 
Navy had planned to give Bath Iron Works the contract on the last three Arleigh Burke 
destroyers in 2005 followed by the DD(X) in 2007. [Ref 10: p. 913] This delay between 
procuring the two classes of ships would have meant that Bath Iron Works would not 
have been starting a new construction for about two years. In order to solve this problem, 
both of Maine’s Senators as well as Representative Allen have lobbied to give the 
shipyard $150 million in advanced procurement as a down payment for one extra Arleigh 
Burke destroyer. [Ref 10: p. 914]  
 Unlike Bath Iron Works, Ingalls has the capability to construct more than one ship 
type. However, the yard was still highly dependent on the future DD(X) contract. After 
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the last Arleigh Burke class is finished in 2005, the shipyard will only be building the 
large amphibious assault ships until 2008. [Ref 10: p. 914] The same company is still 
building the LPD-17, but the construction has been moved from Mississippi to Avondale. 
Unlike the delegation from Maine, both Mississippi Senators have been lobbying to get 
advanced funding for the newer amphibious assault ship. The Mississippi delegation has 
requested $250 million as a down payment to start work on this ship. 
 While the situation in Mississippi does not particularly relate to the DDG-51 
program, it supports a growing trend among the larger shipyards. When a large shipyard 
is about to experience a period of inactivity, that state’s delegation will lobby to gain 
advanced procurement dollars for that yard. Just as when Bath Iron Works received 
money to build an extra destroyer in order to prevent financial difficulties, one can expect 
similar situations in the future. Therefore, the money appropriated to a shipbuilding 



















VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
 Military experience does appear to have an effect on votes for defense 
appropriations. However, this experience has a greater impact on committee actions than 
it does on House and Senate floor voting actions. Prior military experience may make 
some members more inclined to give a defense program its needed dollars. A lack of 
military experience may make others less inclined to support DOD programs. However, 
the actual location where a defense program’s unit is built will be a much greater 
determinant of the appropriations dollars that the program receives. The history of four 
separate shipbuilding programs provides evidence of these conclusions. 
 In the case of the LCS, military experience proved to be a positive indicator for 
the program. In committees that had a great deal of prior military experience, the program 
was seen as an effective, cost saving measure to give the Navy its needed capabilities at a 
reasonable price. Committees that did not have as wide a range of previous military 
experience did not share the same views and, thus, did not support the programs. When 
appropriation decisions were made on the House and Senate floor, however, prior 
military experience did not have as much of an impact. Several changes were made to the 
program which did not directly correlate to the prior experiences of those involved. 
Instead, the shipyards appeared to be the greater concern as funding was given in advance 
for the more expensive DD(X) and DDG-51 programs. These programs helped out the 
larger shipyards while the smaller yards were slated to begin construction on the LCS. 
 The MCM-1 program showed that military experience can have a negative impact 
on appropriations when a program is falling behind. The smaller shipyards in Wisconsin 
had difficulties with producing the first ships of this class. As a result, the House and 
Senate committees withdrew some support for the program. They seemed to show a great 
degree of trepidation with spending advanced procurement dollars on new ships while the 
units already purchased had not been completed. Since the committees involved 
contained a great deal of prior military experience, their actions seemed to be based on 
the perceptions of a need to handle defense money responsibly. Unlike the committee 
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action, the House and Senate floor action did not provide evidence either way as to 
whether prior military experience had any effect on the program’s appropriations. In fact, 
the Wisconsin delegation appeared to be unusually lackluster in its support of the 
program. Upon closer examination, it appears that, since the shipyards did not depend on 
Navy contracts for their survival, the delegation did not see as much need to fight for the 
program. 
 To emphasize this point, the LPD-17 program was treated much differently when 
its shipyard was falling behind schedule. The involved committees desired to delay the 
procurement of additional units until the design problems were fixed. However, when the 
relevant appropriations bills reached the House and Senate floors, advanced funding was 
appropriated for additional units even though the shipyard had not begun construction on 
the first unit. In MCM-1’s case, the shipyards were not able to deliver the first units on 
time, but in LPD-17’s case, the shipyard was still trying to design the first unit. This shift 
in attitude was a direct result of the Mississippi delegation’s lobbying efforts. Realizing 
that Ingalls needed the Navy contract in order to remain fiscally viable, the delegation 
pushed to have some money given to the program by citing that the money would help to 
maintain America’s industrial base. 
 The history of the DDG-51 program provides further evidence of these policies. 
Over the program’s history, committees with a large amount of prior military experience 
have supported the program. Conversely, House and Senate members with a lack of 
military experience have voted against the program when they voted against House and 
Senate Appropriation Bills. Military experience did have an effect on the program, at 
least while the relevant bills were in committee.  
However, the more striking examples of how this program has been treated can be 
seen in recent years. As the larger shipyards were discovering a lag between the end of 
the DDG-51 program and the beginning of the DD(X) program, they grew concerned 
about their financial stability. As a result, the Mississippi and Maine delegations pushed 
to either have new DDG-51 units built or to have advance procurement dollars 
appropriated for the next program. Therefore, while military experience does appear to 
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play a role in how money is appropriated to a program, it is obvious that where a unit is 
actually built is a much greater determinant of funding. 
B. SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS    
 Votes for and against shipbuilding programs did appear to change over time. 
Partiality towards a particular service did not appear to be an issue, either, since some of 
these programs’ greatest supporters did not necessarily have a Navy background. Instead, 
these changes were due to a variety of more practical matters. Cost savings, the needs of 
a changing defense environment, and a shipyard’s ability to produce units on time 
affected the way that most Senators and Representatives voted on these programs. Some 
Senators and Representatives did appear to consistently vote against defense spending. 
These people were, however, few in number and did not appear to influence any 
individual programs. 
There appeared to be greater support for defense programs when the global 
situation demanded the attention. For example, the DDG-51 class was initially built in 
great numbers in order to help create a 580 ship Cold War Navy. Though the LCS 
program will probably never receive the 60 ships requested, the program is scheduled to 
produce units in large numbers in order to fight the Global War on Terror.  
The need for cost savings also appears to drive a program’s support. At a fraction 
of the cost of a new Arleigh Burke or DD(X), the LCS is scheduled to be built in large 
numbers because it is a more cost effective means of maintaining the Navy’s goal of 300 
ships. When the MCM-1 and LPD-17 programs began to lag behind, Congress appeared 
to take a more fiscally responsible route and delay new procurements until the initial 
units were produced.  
However, the exception to each of these rules has been an undercurrent of support 
for a particular constituency. The LPD-17 program was treated much differently than the 
MCM-1 program when both were experiencing delays because Ingalls needed the 
procurement dollars. Though the LCS provided dramatic cost savings over the DD(X), 
the DD(X) program received greater support because Ingalls and Bath Iron Works relied 
on it for their continued operation.  
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This project covered a wide variety of topics in a relatively short span of time. For 
further research, three alternate methods are recommended. First, looking at a wide 
variety of DOD programs over a short span of time may provide useful insights. For 
example, a Representative may appear to support one program over another in the same 
year. This could shed further light on the person’s motivations for supporting a particular 
program. Second, a detailed study into the voting records of a few Senators and 
Representatives may give further insight into whether previous experience affects voting 
patterns. One could pick members from various backgrounds and look at their records 
over time. Finally, a more detailed study of one program over its entire lifespan may 
yield useful insights.  
While conducting the research for this project, two other interesting issues 
presented themselves. First, some Senators and Representatives seemed to have felt 
strongly on a particular issue and those feelings were reflected in how they voted on 
appropriations bills. For example, one Senator felt strongly about the Air Force tanker 
lease program and, due to these sentiments, seemed to show a lack of support for defense 
spending in general. During the Reagan years, some Senators and Representatives 
showed a distinct dislike for strategic weapons programs and those sentiments affected 
their voting patterns. 
Finally, the newer Army programs appear to use parts from almost every state. In 
light of the way that the delegations from Maine and Mississippi have supported certain 
shipbuilding programs, a detailed study of how money has been appropriated to the Army 
may be useful. The Stryker program appears to be relevant. If studied, a good method of 
research would be to obtain the Army’s literature on the program (which details exactly 
where every part is built) and examine whether or not this translated into greater 
Congressional support.  
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